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Thinking about Empire: The Administration of Ulysses S. Grant, Spanish Colonialism and the Ten Years’ 
War in Cuba 
Abstract 
This article examines the attitudes of leading policymakers in the United States toward the Spanish 
empire in Cuba during the Ten Years’ War (1868-78). It suggests that while many in the US objected to 
Spanish imperial practices, concerns about trade alongside ideological predispositions regarding non-
intervention and race led the administration of Ulysses S. Grant, under the direction of Secretary of 
State Hamilton Fish, to develop a series of policies that in effect supported colonialism in Cuba while 
attempting to ensure that the US would benefit from any change in rule there. The article argues that 
despite an apparent desire for the US to remain neutral during the conflict, the Grant administration in 
fact formulated its responses based on a narrow conception of Spanish colonial control that 
demonstrated an increasing sense of moral superiority over both colonizer and colonized.   
 
 2 
Thinking about Empire: The Administration of Ulysses S. Grant, Spanish Colonialism and the Ten Years’ 
War in Cuba 
Writing in the North American Review in March 1898 on the eve of war with Spain, the historian John 
Holladay Latané observed that, since the American Civil War, American policy toward Spain and Cuba 
had been “largely concerned in urging upon Spain the abolition of slavery in Cuba, the establishment of 
a more liberal form of government through independence or autonomy, and the promotion of a more 
untrammelled [sic] commercial intercourse with the United States.”1 In making this observation, Latané 
neatly encapsulated not only the contours of US policy immediately before the outbreak of conflict 
between the United States and the Spanish empire, but some of its elements over the previous 
generation. Before the Spanish-American War, the United States had attempted to attenuate Spanish 
imperial rule through modest and sporadic waves of diplomatic pressure.  
This course of action had been established by the administration of Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877) during 
the so-called Ten Years’ War in Cuba.  This conflict between groups of insurgents and forces of the 
colonial Spanish regime that began in 1868 was broadly coterminous with the eight years of the Grant 
administration and therefore occupied a great deal of its attention.  Inter alia, Cuba’s location, its close 
trade association with the US and longstanding American interests in acquiring (or at least economically 
controlling) the island, as well as the brutal nature of the war itself, were all important factors in 
generating this intense scrutiny that strained relations with Spain on numerous occasions and even 
threatened war following the seizure of the US ship the Virginius in 1873. Throughout the conflict, the 
US government was placed under considerable pressure from Congress and sections of the American 
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press and people to take some action, ranging from recognizing that a state of war existed on the island 
through to military intervention.2  
Yet the Grant administration largely resisted pressure to support the insurgency, and its criticism of 
Spanish rule was consistently muted as important figures in Washington, and especially the Secretary of 
State, Hamilton Fish, sought to modify rather than end Spanish colonial practices. Their primary 
objective was to alter what they saw as the autocratic and at times barbaric nature of Spanish control, 
especially the continuation of slavery (a particular point of contention among members of the 
Republican Party after 1865), and to challenge the exclusion of the United States from open trade with 
Cuba. Yet it did very little to pursue an overtly anti-colonial agenda and at times even supported the 
continuation of Spanish sovereignty over the Cuban population as part of a drive to enhance its own 
material interests in Cuba, avoid antagonizing Madrid and conform to the tenets of the increasingly 
influential Monroe Doctrine.3 While this was partially because of the relatively weak position of the 
United States after its own civil war and during the domestic trauma of Reconstruction, these attitudes 
indicate a complex and often contradictory set of ideas about Spanish imperialism in the Caribbean 
during this period that were important influences on developing conceptions among leading 
                                                          
2
 On the United States and the Ten Years’ War, see especially Jay Sexton, “The United States, the Cuban Rebellion, 
and the Multilateral Initiative of 1875,” Diplomatic History, 30 (2006), 335-65; Lester D. Langley, The Cuban Policy 
of the United States: A Brief History (New York: Wiley, 1968), 53-81; James B Chapin, “Hamilton Fish and the 
Lessons of the Ten Year’s War,” in Jules David, ed., Perspectives on American Diplomacy (New York: Arno, 1976), 
131-63 .  
3
 See Jay Sexton, The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Hill & Wang, 
2011) 
 4 
Republicans of the United States’ regional and global identity, and, ultimately, its emergence as an 
imperial power.4  
While there has been an enormous amount of scholarship on the notion of the United States as an 
empire, both formally in places such as Cuba itself and the Philippines after 1898 and informally around 
the world during and after the Cold War, relatively little has been written about American views of 
European empires in the late nineteenth century and especially during Reconstruction.5 Indeed, some of 
the most influential American commentaries on European forms of imperialism have been in popular 
rather than academic writings, such as those by Mark Twain and Jack London.6 This lack of sustained 
attention to high-level political thought about empires is curious when the US operated largely within an 
Atlantic system dominated by European nations, and the main challenge to its influence in the Americas 
came not from other American countries but from European colonial and former colonial powers.  
In part, this omission can be attributed to what Ann Laura Stoler has indentified as the awkwardness of 
aligning notions of an American empire with those of European colonialism. As she suggests, at first 
glance the idea of an American metropole controlling subjugated colonies seems anomalous in the 
context of US history, except perhaps for the Philippines in the first half of the twentieth century. Yet, as 
Stoler also notes, the “uncertainties” of terms associated with empires should not be viewed as what 
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she calls “conceptual liabilities” but rather seen as “entry points for further analysis.”7 In this spirit 
(although he does not cite Stoler’s work), David Hendrickson has sought to provide a taxonomy of 
American international thought from the earliest stages of the union that utilizes the contending 
concepts of “American internationalism,” “nationalism” and “imperialism” to understand how 
Americans saw their developing role in the world. Specifically, Hendrickson suggests that imperialism is 
a relatively new concept because most Americans have traditionally thought in nationalistic terms. 
Although he concedes that both economic and cultural nationalism, when carried to extremes, can spill 
over into forms of imperialism, Hendrickson propounds a view of nineteenth century political thought 
that privileged non-intervention and self-determination over intervention and interference, and 
therefore nationalism over imperialism.8 While undoubtedly helpful in understanding competing strands 
of international thought, Hendrickson’s conception of empire can be criticized for being too narrow and 
static, as well as lacking in historical specificity. In the immediate post-Civil War period, for example, the 
brief moment of optimism about the possibilities of emancipation at home encouraged African-
American political activists such as Frederick Douglass to support pan American ideals as a way to 
advance the lives of African-Americans in the United States and elsewhere in the Americas. Despite 
rejecting arguments in favor of the forcible acquisition of territory, and opposition to such schemes as 
the purchase of a naval base at Môle St. Nicholas in Haiti, Douglass utilized idea of black pan 
Americanism to support President Grant’s ultimately unsuccessful policy of annexing the Dominican 
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Republic.9 Therefore, as postcolonialists such as Stoler and Amy Kaplan have argued, broadening 
understandings of what constitutes an empire and its related forms, including through literary studies 
and anthropology as well as historical case-studies, can help dilute notions of American exceptionalism 
by drawing out connections between American and European imperial experiences, and domestic and 
foreign politics, without, in Frederick Cooper’s words, using the notion of empire “as an epithet for any 
form of power.”10  
This article contends that conceptions of colonialism at the institutional level, as well as the threats this 
colonialism posed to US trade and commerce, were crucial themes in the development of expansionist 
thought in the United States in the years that followed the Civil War. While Americans in positions of 
influence often objected to the idea and some of the practices of colonialism, they usually did so not 
because of an overriding anti-imperial ideology, but because of the constraints that formal European 
colonial control placed on American economic expansion and the spread of republican ideals, especially 
in the Americas. Many had a grudging admiration for the way the European powers, and the British in 
particular, were amassing economic power after 1850, especially through the informal imperialism 
practiced throughout much of the Americas in which these powers sought to gain the economic benefits 
of imperial dominance without the constraints of formal colonial control, even if they were dissatisfied 
with the resulting limits that it placed on U.S. economic expansionism. Moreover, their objections to the 
imposition of more formal patterns of imperial rule often led them to overlook both the aspirations of 
the colonized and the colonizers’ attempts to reform. This article argues that in reducing the 
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complexities of imperialism to supposed transgressions of what Washington accepted as “civilized” 
norms in international affairs, these Americans were increasingly “thinking like an empire” as they 
considered their own place in the international system.11 
  
During the nineteenth century Cuba held enormous symbolic power in the United States, perhaps more 
than its political or diplomatic status warranted, and by the middle of the century Cuba’s economic and 
industrial development only served to reinforce this and to undermine the case for continued Spanish 
rule. The geographic proximity of Cuba to the United States gave the US access and as early as the 
1820s, Louis Perez suggests that 50 per cent of Cuba’s trade was dependent on access to North 
American markets.12 Moreover, before the American Civil War many people in the United States had 
looked to Cuba to bring it and other American territories into the Union, most notably as a way to 
expand the institution of slavery and the power of the slaveholding south. Such ideas went back at least 
as far as Thomas Jefferson and culminated in the 1854 Ostend Manifesto that sought to annex Cuba, 
tainting US-Cuban relations and raising the ire of many northerners in the United States. Yet, as John 
Patrick Leary has recently shown, US views of Cuba were extremely complex and often contradictory, 
and, during the 1840s and 1850s, northerners as well as southerners often supported annexation even if 
they disagreed on the reasons for, and the means of, achieving it.13 Emancipation in the United States 
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changed the nature of these discussions, but debates about annexation continued following the Civil 
War. 
Although the US still held no territorial possessions in the Caribbean in the years after 1865, its growing 
economic power increasingly saw it vying for commercial and trading influence with the European 
colonial powers in such places as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. From the 1870s, burgeoning 
global demand for sugar, especially in Western Europe and North America, and the high capital costs of 
investing in the industry gave first Cubans and then capitalists from the United States increasing access 
in Santo Domingo. Yet US domination of sugar markets there was not complete before the 1890s.14 
Similarly in Haiti, investors and traders from the United States dominated only staple goods, while 
Europeans – and especially those from Great Britain – did so in other areas.15 Yet the influence of the US 
was rising, a fact aptly illustrated by events in Cuba immediately following the end of the American Civil 
War when a new repressive ministry in Spain imposed a new set of protectionist policies to which the 
United States responded by placing tariffs on numerous Cuban goods. These moves coincided with a 
drop in sugar production and prices that brought disaster to the Cuban economy and further exposed 
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the problems of Spanish rule, setting off calls for revolution that resulted in the start of ten years of 
fighting.16 
US suspicion of Spanish imperialism at this time was not simply based on economic imperatives, 
however. The desire among settlers in the United States for land that was occupied by Spain had 
inevitably brought mutual suspicion and mistrust that was, in James Cortada’s words, “virtually 
institutionalized” by both governments in the first years of the US republic, and this continued for 
decades afterwards.17 Moreover, as María DeGuzmán has recently argued, the development of a distinct 
national identity in the United States was based in part on “repulsion” and “romancing” of Spanish 
figures in cultural contexts. DeGuzmán notes that this phenomenon developed as the nineteenth 
century progressed despite Spain’s weakening position in the Americas and it contributed to a 
perception that, even after independence from Spain, Latin America was distinctly Spanish. DeGuzmán 
therefore concludes that Spain acted as something of a “bridge” between “colonizer and colonized” 
rather than simply being seen as a white, Catholic colonizer.18 
During the period of Reconstruction, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish in many ways embodied this 
complex and apparently contradictory set of attitudes toward European imperialism in general and 
Spanish imperialism in particular. Fish served for all of Grant’s term of office and thus dominated the 
policymaking process during almost all of the Ten Years’ War. A former Whig, Fish was a rather colorless 
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figure and because of this he has been marginalized in the historiography of United States foreign 
relations in spite of his length of service and relative importance.19 Moreover, he dominated American 
diplomacy during a decade of hesitancy in the 1870s, succeeding his much better known friend William 
H. Seward, who had cut something of a lonely figure in calling for a rapidly expanding US commercial 
empire in the age of the Civil War, but preceding those who advocated building-up US naval power, 
developing island coaling stations and negotiating new customs treaties as a means to attain greater 
regional influence, and who began to flourish in the 1880s. Fish therefore essentially plotted a middle 
course between isolationism and interventionism, unilateralism and multilateralism, suspicion of the 
imperial powers and recognition that their geopolitical power necessitated involvement in the 
hemisphere. Furthermore, he exemplified the tension in American diplomacy between a desire for 
global influence alongside clear limits on territorial acquisitions, and, very much like Seward, he saw 
advantages in a European-style informal empire for the United States. Fish was therefore a product of 
his times; determined to enhance the American position in the Caribbean, but aware of the limits of US 
influence at the specific moment in which he held office. He knew that the United States was 
unprepared to fully embrace Seward’s calls for an expanded commercial empire, as he had seen in his 
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predecessor’s unsuccessful attempts to acquire the Danish West Indies and the naval station at Môle St. 
Nicolas in the late 1860s, and as he experienced himself when he failed to persuade a reluctant 
Congress to endorse President Grant’s scheme to acquire the Dominican Republic in 1870.  
Like many of his contemporaries, Fish’s particular ambivalence toward Cuba at this time resulted from 
his concern about the potential social, political and economic consequences for the United States of the 
debilitating Cuban war. In principle it seems that he supported eventual Cuban independence, noting at 
the beginning of his tenure the “sympathy which Americans feel for all people striving to secure for 
themselves more liberal institutions and that inestimable right of self government which we prize as the 
foundation of all progress and achievement.”20 Yet Fish had visited the island in 1855 and, while he liked 
much of what he saw there, was repelled by the population because of its racial make-up.21 He believed 
the black Cuban to be inferior to the black American and therefore rejected the idea that Cuba could be 
brought into the union – an important consideration in his mind when he became secretary of state as 
the fourteenth amendment had just been adopted – and instead preferred the idea that an independent 
Cuba would be a “guardianship or trusteeship” of the United States, a patronizing and infantilizing view 
that seemed to reflect a broader American desire to play the role of “political mentor” that Janice Jayes 
has identified in relation to Mexico.22  
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Fish’s notion of guardianship spoke to broader Republican concerns about the racial problems of 
expansion into the Caribbean. Race also played an important part in generating negative reactions to 
the Santo Domingo purchase, which key Republicans such as Justin S. Morrill, Carl Schurtz, and Charles 
Sumner opposed in part because of the potential difficulties that they envisioned with integrating 
people of color from the Caribbean into the US system of government. Sumner, Chairman of the 
powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee and therefore the most prominent of these men, based 
his highly influential arguments on the notion that, despite being equal, different races were destined to 
inhabit different geographical areas and, in rejecting annexation of Santo Domingo, he instead 
suggested some form of protectorate as an alternative.23 For Fish, moving toward such a position of 
guardianship over Cuba would take time, however. The first occasion Grant’s cabinet met to consider 
the Cuba problem, Fish observed that it was “too soon to decide the question; that the madness and 
fatuity of the Spanish Dominion in Cuba seemed to be producing a condition of affairs and state of 
feeling that would compel all the civilized nations to regard the Spanish rule as an international 
nuisance, which must be abated, when they would all be glad that we should interpose and regulate 
control of the island.”24  
Fish’s views were based on racial stereotypes suggesting that the Cuban forces were unable to organize 
themselves politically; reinforcing a belief that Spanish rule remained the least bad option for the 
present time. In following this line, the United States government during the 1870s largely accepted 
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Spanish contentions that because of Cuba’s racial make-up and history, in Ada Ferrer’s words, it “could 
not be a nation.”25 Perhaps based on his skepticism about the abilities of the Cuban population, Fish was 
unconvinced about the insurgency’s chances of success. Early in the war, Fish disagreed with the 
president who thought the Spanish would have trouble regaining control of the island, claiming it was 
the insurgents who would fail because they were “inefficient, & have done little for themselves”.26  
The influence of this racial prejudice can even be seen in the infamous Virginius affair of 1873, which 
brought the United States and Spain close to war and has received considerable scholarly attention, but 
which in fact failed to produce any meaningful change in the attitude toward Spanish imperialism in 
Washington. The capture of the ship flying the US flag by Spain and the execution of a large number of 
its crew, including 53 Americans, caused uproar in the US, as many called for the nation to declare war 
on Spain, and led to Madrid having to pay indemnity charges to cover all the claims.27 But while the 
Grant administration seemed to be moving toward a position where it might actually recognize the 
insurgents, the incident in fact had little impact on the broader parameters of Grant and Fish’s Cuban 
policy.  
In addition to racial prejudice, Richard Bradford suggests that a number of different factors, including 
the lack of public and political desire for war, an uninfluential press, and the relatively poor state of US 
forces following the end of the Civil War all helped to prevent a declaration of war on Spain. Yet it was 
the race issue that was of particular importance, he argues, because of the dim view Fish and his 
colleagues took of the black population in Cuba and the deep divisions in the United States following the 
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conclusion of the Civil War. The Virginius affair led to the removal from office of Daniel E. Sickles, the 
ambassador to Madrid, primarily because of his attempt to steer the United States toward war with 
Spain. Yet it was also significant that his replacement, the moderate Caleb Cushing, reinforced Fish’s 
racial views. Cushing complained to Fish, for example, that the rebels could “produce no man of 
commanding military talent” because “otherwise they would find something better to do than merely to 
burn and murder, and would be commanded by Cubans, not by Dominicans and Mexicans.”28 On 
another occasion, he claimed that there was a greater threat to the Creoles than to Spain in Cuba 
because the insurgency sought to eliminate the white race there. He drew parallels with the Haitian 
revolution at the beginning of the century, and suggested that the current state of affairs promised “to 
carry Cuba for generations to come into the same series of military usurpations, sanguinary civil wars, 
[and] sterile revolutions, with their accompanying barbarism, which have characterized independent 
Hayti.”29 Bradford also notes the importance of relations with Spain, in particular because at the time of 
the incident Spain was a republic and the US government saw this as a potentially much more liberal 
regime that chimed with American values and held out the possibility of reform in the colonies.30 More 
than this, influential public figures such as Sumner, Schurz and Oliver P. Morton continued to urge 
caution and emphasized their respect for Spain. 31 It therefore did not change US attitudes toward either 
the Spanish colonial regime or those who were fighting against it. Furthermore, in coming to such 
conclusions about the supposed inability of Caribbean peoples to look after themselves, Fish, Cushing 
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and others were, ironically, re-inscribing arguments made by slaveholders from the south. From her new 
home in Cuba on the eve of the Ten Years’ War, for example, former Louisiana slaveholder Eliza 
McHatton wrote to her sister: “The more we see of the Cuban character, the more convinced we are 
that a military government is what they need. They are totally unfit for freedom & the pusillanimous 
puppies will never have it unless some strong nation fights for it, for them.”32 The language that Fish and 
Cushing employed may have been subtler, but the sentiment was strikingly similar. 
Despite Fish’s cynicism about the prospects for Cuba, however, many Americans were more positive, 
placing the secretary of state and President Grant under considerable domestic pressure to recognize 
the belligerency. President Grant was, in fact, sympathetic to the Cuban cause and he expressed a belief 
that the Cubans would succeed.33 Early in the war, other influential Americans also took the side of 
those struggling to escape from Spanish colonialism, perhaps most prominently Secretary of War, John 
A. Rawlins (who had close links with the rebels) and Daniel Sickles, both of whom believed that the 
Cubans deserved their independence and wanted Grant and Fish to aid the insurgency. A lower ranked 
official went further: as Grant was taking office, Henry R. de La Reintre, the US Vice Consul in Havana 
resigned his position in protest at Spanish actions against American citizens, and urged Grant to 
recognize Cuban autonomy.34 Simultaneously, in the first of many congressional interventions, the 
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House of Representatives passed a bipartisan resolution, stating that the people of the United States 
were in sympathy with those of Cuba “in their effort to secure their independence,” and would 
“welcome to the family of independent nations a republican government that guarantees the liberty of 
all persons.” It authorized the president to recognize the independence of Cuba “whenever in his 
opinion a republican form of government shall have been in fact established.”35  
Grant also received correspondence from many US citizens in support of the rebellion, and various 
groups around the nation passed resolutions in favor of the Cuban cause.36 Influential minister and 
President of Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, Edward Greenleaf Eliot’s views on the affair 
were typical. In a missive to Grant in early 1873, Eliot acknowledged the difficulties of interfering in 
another nation’s affairs, but argued that Cuba was a unique case, not just because the island was close 
to the United States but because its predicament touched on such fundamental issues: “it is a struggle 
of freedom against tyranny, and we, as a free nation, ought not to stand coldly looking…for there are 
great principles of humanity which, in the long trial, become the grandest statesmanship: and if we, as a 
nation, permit that old oppressor, Spain, to tread down the hopes of freedom in that beautiful land, 
History will sorely punish us for our neglect.”37 
Yet Fish resisted these kinds of pressures fairly easily by using recent precedents. Although a number of 
issues dominated his refusal to recognize the rebels, early British and French recognition of the 
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Confederacy during the American Civil War through their declaration of neutrality was the most 
important.38 As Washington’s objections to these actions were a part of the ongoing Alabama claims, 
Fish knew that it was very difficult for the US to contemplate acknowledging the belligerency of the 
Cuban rebels without being seen as hypocritical.39 Commenting on the House resolution, the New York 
Times concurred: “Any plea now presented for acknowledging the Cuban insurrection, or for hastily 
recognizing any body purporting to be a Government which the insurrection may produce, may be urged 
with greater force by Great Britain and France in justification of their conduct toward the Confederacy.” 
It suggested that if the House was right to argue for belligerent rights during the present struggle in 
Cuba which was “trifling”, then the European powers were correct to grant the privileges of belligerency 
in 1861 to “a rebellion which by comparison was gigantic.”40 
In private at least, many Republicans hoped that the rebellion signaled the end of Spanish imperialism in 
the hemisphere, yet they also worried about antagonizing Spain because, as the unrest lingered and 
periodically worsened, they harbored deep fears that it would be exacerbated by the intervention of 
other European powers, perhaps even in concert with one another. Charles Sumner said that he wished 
“the Cuba question looked clearer, & nearer a solution. Spain must go, & the sooner she sees it the 
better for all.”41 Yet he thought that recognizing the insurgency “would be a wrong to Spain; therefore I 
cannot consent to it.” Sumner detested the idea that the US might go to war, although it was also clear 
that the philanthropic outlook he adopted here was tempered by his admission that such a war would 
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divert attention from his real goal of gaining (newly independent) Canada.42 He was sympathetic to the 
Cuban rebels but repelled by the idea that the US might actually try to control Cuba as a colony. Instead, 
he believed that it was the duty of the United States government to convince liberals within Spain that 
“the day of European colonies has passed – at least in this hemisphere” and that, like other Caribbean 
islands such as Santo Domingo, Cuba would move into the American orbit and become a US 
protectorate.43 Similarly, future president James A. Garfield argued in the House of Representatives that 
it was not the moment to “increase our complications with foreign nations.” He continued: “I hope our 
government will be very slow in taking any measures in relation to Cuba, in relation to Spain, in relation 
to Great Britain and in relation to any other nation with whom we are now at peace to deepen the angry 
feelings which already exist.”44 
In response to these pressures, Fish could present the government’s position as one that titled toward 
ideological support for anti-imperial causes while resisting calls to interfere in the affairs of European 
nations in the Americas, as set out in the Monroe Doctrine. Prefacing comments on Cuba in his first 
annual message to Congress, for example, President Grant (in a passage written by Fish) explained that 
because the United States was “the freest of all nations” its people sympathized with those who 
struggled for “liberty and self-government”. Yet he noted that “we should abstain from enforcing our 
views upon unwilling nations and from taking an interested part, without invitation, in the quarrels 
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between different nations or between governments and their subjects [emphasis added].”45 So the 
president authorized Sickles to offer the good offices of the United States to the Cabinet in Madrid on 
the following terms: that the independence of Cuba would be acknowledged by Spain; that Cuba would 
pay compensation to Spain in recognition of her interests in the island, although this might be paid in 
installments; the abolition of slavery in Cuba; and an armistice pending the agreement of terms.46 
Beyond such practical considerations, Fish’s perceptions of the nature of Spanish rule reinforced a sense 
of superiority on the part of the United States government over both colonizer and colonized. In his 
reports back to his superior, Sickles did much to emphasize the vicious tactics that the Spanish troops 
were willing to employ and augmented these with cuttings from Spanish newspapers, some of which 
began speculating that Spain would lose the war, or at least that it would be years before the rebellion 
was brought under control.47 In fact, pressure from groups within Spain to attenuate their rule in Cuba 
was widespread, and successive governments in Madrid made attempts to reform throughout the 
conflict. Some in the Spanish military offered concessions to those who surrendered, for example, 
General Arsenio Martínez Campos’ whose activities in central Cuba from 1876 combined renewed 
military vigor with promises of pardons or even money if rebels turned themselves in.48  
This is not to suggest that Spanish conduct in the war was commendable, far from it; rather that Fish 
and some of those around him generally did not (perhaps could not) recognize the changes that were 
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taking place. In 1872, for example, Fish wrote to Sickles to complain that while Spanish diplomats had 
often acknowledged the oppression to which Washington objected over the previous few years, Madrid 
had done nothing of any significance to deal with it: “Again and again did you remonstrate against this 
thing as offensive to American civilization and dangerous to it…” Fish commented. “All of your 
remonstrances have been met with silence; no reply having been made to your complaints on the 
subject of this grievance.”49 Even after the accession of more liberal regimes in Madrid and, from 
February 1873, a republican government, Washington apparently saw little moderation in Spain’s brutal 
oppression.50  
The Grant administration also urged the Spanish to move toward what Fish called “efficient and 
practical” abolition of slavery.51 This was certainly a delicate enterprise. While before the Civil War many 
Americans had often looked to expand slavery US slavery by incorporating Cuba, now the main impetus 
for a closer association with Cuba came from radical Republicans such as Nathaniel P. Banks, Orville 
Babcock and Benjamin Butler, who saw abolition as an achievable outcome of the Cuban struggle and, in 
Butler’s case, even suggested going to war with Spain to achieve it.52 Furthermore, emancipation in the 
United States encouraged Cuban reformers to seek a closer association with the US, and perhaps even 
annexation, in order to rid the island of slavery.53 This gave Fish cause to worry that any statement the 
president made could be seized upon by those in the US who supported recognition of the belligerency, 
                                                          
49
 See Fish to Sickles, 19 April 1872 in Grant Papers, 23, 73. 
50
 See esp. Fish to Sickles, 23 April 1873, Fish Papers, Instructions, Spain, box 238, LOC; Fish to Sickles, 24 April 
1873, Ibid; Fish to Sickles, 27 Aug. 1873, FRUS, 1873, 1032-3.  
51
 Fish to Sickles, 31 Aug. 1872, Fish Papers, Diplomatic Drafts, box 229, LOC. 
52
 See Sexton, “Multilateral Initiative of 1875,” 351-353. 
53
 Cushing to Fish, 23 Nov. 1874, RG 59, M31, roll 64, NARA.  
 21 
and thus allow the US to “drift” into a war that he thought was “unwilling of the dignity of a Great 
Government…”54  
Perhaps because he did not know about them, Fish largely failed to acknowledge the tentative steps 
that Spain was taking toward abolition, as well as the effects these changes were having on the ground. 
As Rebecca Scott has shown, very gradual emancipation began during the Ten Years’ War, and the 
process was highly complex and challenging. From early in the war, the insurgency in some parts of the 
country (especially in the east) encouraged what Scott labels “nominal” abolition that saw some slaves 
freeing themselves and fighting for independence. These developments placed pressure on the 
metropolitan center and, in response, the Spanish Cortes introduced the so-called Moret Law of 1870 
that gave freedom to very young and old slaves, but also held out the promise of emancipation to 
others, thus changing the parameters of the debate about slavery and offering the possibility of ending 
it.55 Such moves were certainly limited because, as Christopher Schmidt-Nowara argues, planters 
resisted such reforms and so slavery largely continued as before, but these attempts were largely lost on 
Washington. Caleb Cushing lamented that he do could little regarding reform in Cuba because no 
Spanish leader was politically strong enough to make sufficient concessions.56 “Thus far all the efforts of 
Spain have proved abortive,” stated Grant in the section of his 1875 address that Fish had written, “and 
time has marked no improvement in the situation.”57  
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Paradoxically, despite this generally negative view of Spain, Fish bolstered his case for refusing to aid the 
rebels in Cuba because, just like the Spanish, they were participating in acts of extreme violence that 
apparently undermined their case for independence. In part, Fish objected to these practices because 
they threatened US economic interests on the island and the well being of many Americans who lived 
there, another point of contention between Washington and Madrid during the conflict. But in taking 
this stance, he outlined a set of norms and standards to which, he and the president claimed, “civilized” 
nations were supposed to conform and which both the Spanish imperialists and aspiring Cuban 
republicans had failed to do. This was, of course, particularly problematic following the bloody American 
Civil War, which could hardly be characterized as “civilized” on either side, but with slavery now 
abolished in the United States, Washington believed it could occupy a superior moral position.58 Thus, 
the measures being taken by the insurgents against Spain suited Fish because they relieved pressure on 
him to favor one side over another.59  
It seems that Fish went as far as he could to dampen support for the Cuban insurgents. In January 1870, 
he planted a story in the New York Herald claiming that the rebellion was effectively over, although he 
knew that this was definitely not the case, to try to reduce the clamor for recognition.60 And when, in 
1872, a ship, the Pioneer, had arrived in Rhode Island claiming to be from the Cuban Republic, and the 
captain of the vessel said he was from the Cuban Navy and requested official recognition from the 
Secretary of State because the Cuban insurgency had been recognized by a number of American nations, 
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Fish demurred.61 He claimed that he could not officially receive him, even as a private citizen, a line he 
held despite the captain’s appeal to the precedent of the American Revolution when France recognized 
the independence of the United States while other countries did not. Grant, under the influence of Fish, 
was also clear that Spain was “a nation with whom the United States are at peace” and so gave the 
Marshall of the District of Rhode Island permission to take possession of the vessel. In response, the 
captain complained of a conspiracy between the United States and Spain.62 This episode was something 
of a forerunner of the much better known incident concerning the Virginius that took place the 
following year, showing Fish’s deeply entrenched views and his ability to utilize the necessary diplomatic 
means to avoid involvement in Cuban affairs. 
 
In 1874, Fish summarized his approach to the Ten Years’ War as secretary of state: “the interest of the 
United States in Cuba was heightened by a desire that the deadly struggle on the island might end in the 
acquisition of self-government (whether under, or free from, Spanish rule was of course Immaterial to 
an American) and in the abolition of slavery.”63 While there had been considerable tension in the United 
States over Fish’s approach, it became the dominant one as the Grant administration promoted and 
reinforced a pattern of American behavior that simultaneously denied Cuba’s right to independence, 
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broadly upheld the Spanish regime while simultaneously berating it for its brutality, and ensured that if 
there were changes in the balance of power then the US would be able to reap the economic benefits.64  
While, as has been noted, this approach in part reflected material constraints, it also spoke to ideology, 
specifically the delicate balance between northern leaders’ ideas about the place of the United States in 
the global order. As David Hendrickson suggests, it is important to recognize the competing arguments 
that privileged nationalism, internationalism, and imperialism within this discourse at different times. 
Yet discussions about imperialism did not stand in isolation either from internal developments or 
relations with the other imperial powers. Just like European imperialism, the growth of American 
economic and diplomatic power was a dynamic and contradictory series of processes that must be 
understood as having what Stoler calls “movement and oscillation at the center.”65 In the Cuban case, a 
developing sense of imperial power in the United States during the 1860s and into the 1870s did not 
simply mean making a choice of intervention or even annexation over non-involvement. As Fish and his 
colleagues recognized, US interests on the island gave it considerable influence, so that in some cases a 
lack of action (especially by the government) might be counted as an imperial maneuver.  
Yet it is significant that key members of the government of the United States at the time conceived of 
themselves, and therefore the nation they represented, as being anti-imperial. In Anthony Pagden’s 
words, developing notions of a “shared sovereignty” beyond what the leaders of the United States saw 
as the natural boundaries of the nation was “unthinkable.”66 These figures believed the development of 
an American empire in the European sense fundamentally contradicted their view of the United States 
as a nation, despite its growth depending upon the subjugation and exclusion of native tribal 
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populations and people of color. In this view, while Spain bore much of the responsibility for the way it 
conducted its colonial policy and fought the Ten Years’ War in Cuba, the insurgency’s complicity in 
atrocities and apparent failure to organize itself politically rendered it morally “irresponsible” and 
therefore lacking the requisite qualities to justify sovereignty and self-determination.67 In encouraging 
Spain to form more progressive policies, then, the United States government reaffirmed its own position 
as a moral leader, while separating itself from its neighbors and, at least to an extent, from the 
European imperial powers, but aligning itself with notions of “civilization” as it sought to enhance its 
international status. 
While there was significant disagreement about foreign affairs, and specifically the situation in Cuba, 
during the Reconstruction era and beyond, the development of a body of thought that considered the 
actions of other powers and used them as reference points as the US sought a more coherent vision of 
its place in the world is significant. The stance that Grant and Fish took toward Spain was part of a 
broader response to European imperialism around the world, but especially within the ever-widening US 
sphere of influence. There is no doubt that they believed they were opposed to European imperial 
practices because they favored independent nations. Yet because of their developing links with 
European nations and because they felt themselves to be an ever more important player in the global 
system, they increasingly and perhaps subconsciously sought to ape aspects of policies practiced by the 
major European powers, and they expected other nations to follow them. They generally preferred 
order to the chaos generated by such events as the Ten Years’ War and could therefore justify 
supporting a “civilized” form of empire that sought to better the populations of certain areas while 
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holding out the chance of some form of self-rule in the longer term. Thus, the imperial mindset that was 
crystallizing at this time had profound and long-term consequences.  
 
